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Abstract
Platforms critically rely on rating systems to learn the quality of market participants. In
practice, however, these ratings are often highly inflated, and therefore not very informative. In
this paper, we first investigate whether the platform can obtain less inflated, more informative
ratings by altering the meaning and relative importance of the levels in the rating system.
Second, we seek a principled approach for the platform to make these choices in the design of
the rating system.
First, we analyze the results of a randomized controlled trial on an online labor market in
which an additional question was added to the feedback form. Between treatment conditions,
we vary the question phrasing and answer choices; in particular, the treatment conditions in-
clude several positive-skewed verbal rating scales with descriptive phrases or adjectives providing
specific interpretation for each rating level. The online labor market test reveals that current
inflationary norms can in fact be countered by re-anchoring the meaning of the levels of the
rating system. In particular, the positive-skewed verbal rating scales yield rating distributions
that significantly reduce rating inflation and are much more informative about seller quality.
Second, we develop a model-based framework to compare and select among rating system
designs, and apply this framework to the data obtained from the online labor market test. Our
simulations demonstrate that our model-based framework for scale design and optimization can
identify the most informative rating system and substantially improve the quality of information
obtained over baseline designs.
Overall, our study illustrates that rating systems that are informative in practice can be
designed, and demonstrates how to design them in a principled manner.
1 Introduction
Rating systems are an integral part of modern online markets. Marketplaces for products (Amazon
and eBay), ridesharing (Lyft and Uber), housing (Airbnb), and freelancing all employ rating systems
to vet platform participants. Buyers rely on ratings to choose which products to buy and how much
to pay, and platforms use ratings to identify both poor and great performers, and in ranking search
results. Ratings are consequential: a high score typically directly translates to more visibility and
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sales. Indeed, without effective mechanisms to collect feedback after matches, online markets would
be “flying blind” in reducing search frictions between buyers and sellers.
Despite their central importance, extensive prior work suggests the standard rating systems of
many online platforms are not sufficiently informative, i.e., ratings do not sufficiently discriminate
between high and low quality sellers. A major causal factor in this lack of informativeness is
rating inflation, where most participants predominantly receive high ratings. Heavily skewed rating
distributions lead to systems in which noise dominates, and as a result buyers are challenged to
extract meaningful signal from available rating scores.
Several empirical studies have established the prevalence of rating inflation. On eBay, more
than 90% of sellers studied between 2011 and 2014 had a rating of at least 98% positive, and more
transactions result in a dispute than in negative feedback (Nosko and Tadelis, 2015). On the online
freelancing platform oDesk, average ratings rose by one star over seven years (Filippas et al., 2018).
On Uber, an average rating of 4.6 out of 5 stars puts a driver at risk of deactivation (Cook, 2015).
On Airbnb, almost 95% of hosts have an average rating of 4.5-5 out of 5 stars (Zervas et al., 2015).
On Amazon, ratings tend to be bimodal with a big peak near the most positive score and then a
(much) smaller one near the most negative one (Hu et al., 2009). Numerous other works report
similar findings; Tadelis (2016) provides a thorough review of the literature.
The empirical literature concludes that inflated ratings are less informative about quality dif-
ferences among participants. For example, Filippas et al. (2018) notes that the increase in average
ratings at oDesk could not be explained solely by higher seller performance, indicating that rating
informativeness dropped over time as ratings inflated. As a consequence of inflation, negative rat-
ings carry outsized influence, because they are so rare; for example, Cabral and Hortacsu (2010)
find that on eBay a seller’s first negative feedback reduces her weekly sales growth rate from 5%
down to −8%.
In this paper we investigate whether platforms can improve the quality of information obtained
by changing the design of the rating scale that they employ. In particular, we ask: by carefully
choosing both the meaning and importance of different answer choices in a rating scale, can plat-
forms elicit higher quality information from their raters, i.e., such that the platform recovers the
true relative qualities of sellers with fewer ratings? Our main contributions are as follows.
Reducing rating inflation via positive-skewed verbal scales. First, we establish evidence
that a careful choice of the rating scale can in fact strongly reduce rating inflation. In particular,
we analyze a test in the live rating system of a large online labor market. In this test, the plat-
form asks buyers to choose from a list of phrases (e.g., Best Freelancer I’ve Hired) or adjectives
(e.g., Fantastic!). Our results show that platforms can effectively combat rating inflation by using
positive-skewed verbal scales: the rating distribution obtained from such scales is substantially more
dispersed than under the “standard” star rating scale. Most starkly, in our experiment, 80.6% of
freelancers received the best possible numeric (i.e., star) rating, but less than 35.8% were rated with
the highest-ranked verbal phrase across non-numeric treatment cells. We further provide evidence
that inflation over time can be countered: ratings on our additional question did not inflate over
the test time period, in contrast to an inflation of about 0.3 points (on a five star scale) over a
similar time period after the introduction of a new numeric rating system on the same platform,
cf. Filippas et al. (2018). Our findings suggest that in platforms today, the norm is that any ac-
ceptable experience is given the top numeric rating, with the rest of the scale reserved for various
degrees of unacceptable experiences.
Positive-skewed verbal scales yields more informative ratings. Second, we establish
evidence that the verbal scales we tested yield more informative ratings. In particular, we show
ratings given with the positive-skewed verbal adjective scales are more predictive of whether a
freelancer will be re-hired by the client in the near-future: clients are up to 30.8% more likely to
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rehire the freelancer during the test period after giving them a top rating from a positive-skewed
scale than after giving them the top numeric score. In addition, for each freelancer we estimate
their quality through the experimental data itself (carefully handling endogeneity concerns) and
then produce an estimated joint distribution of freelancer quality and the ratings they receive with
a given ratings scale. The distributions qualitatively reveal that positive-skewed verbal scales are
much more informative about freelancer quality than are numeric scales.
A principled approach to comparing rating system designs. Third, we provide a princi-
pled approach to comparison of different rating system designs. In particular, we develop a metric
on the joint distribution of seller quality and resulting ratings that directly reflects the typical
goal of a rating system: to learn about sellers as quickly as possible. We develop a mathematical
framework where the performance of a rating system is measured through the large deviations rate
of convergence of the seller ranking via observed score to the true underlying seller quality rank-
ing. This rate is the exponent in the exponential decay of the Kendall’s τ distance between the
estimated and true seller rankings over time.
We develop a stylized model for rating system design within which we calculate these conver-
gence rates. We define a fictitious “marketplace” in which sellers accumulate ratings over time,
with match rates proportional to their quality. Buyers rate sellers using a multi-level rating scale,
i.e., buyers are asked to answer a multiple choice question (e.g., 1-5 stars, or a set of adjectives
describing the interaction) when rating the seller. The platform can choose amongst several rating
scale options that differ in their levels (e.g., adjectives); these scale options induce different buyer
rating behavior. The platform can also set the scores to assign to these adjectives (e.g., the seller
might receive a “5” if the buyer selects the best adjective, and a “3.7” if they select the second
best adjective). Within this marketplace, different design choices (scale choices and scores) differ in
the rates of convergence to the true quality ranking they induce, with higher rates reflecting better
designs.
We show that given behavioral data of how buyers have rated sellers under various rating system
designs in our test, this framework can be effectively employed to compare and select among the
designs. In particular, we apply this framework to the data from our online labor market test. This
process reveals the quantitative gains in convergence rate obtained by verbal rating scales over the
naive numeric rating system. Interestingly, our framework also reveals that the first order effect on
the rate of convergence comes from the choice of verbal descriptions on the scale; optimizing the
choice of scores yields a lower order improvement in performance.
Taken together, our results suggest that platforms have much to gain by optimizing the meaning
of the levels in their rating systems, and in particular using positive-skewed verbal rating scales
instead of numeric scales. Our managerial insight is that ratings on online platforms are not
doomed to be highly inflated; rating behavior is responsive to how the system is designed, and good
rating behavior can be both quantified and obtained through a structured design methodology. Our
entire approach of experimenting with various rating scales and then choosing amongst them in a
principled manner also provides a framework for doing the same in other ratings contexts, including
where other behavioral challenges (such as bias or deflation) may be present. For example, in
Section B in the Appendix, we repeat our experiment, design approach, and analysis in a synthetic
rating setting on Amazon Mechanical Turk where we have access to expert ratings on item quality.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains related work. In Section 3,
we describe the labor market test, with results presented in Section 4. In Section 5 we describe a
model and approach to evaluating and designing a multi-level rating scale. Finally, in Section 5.3, we
apply our design approach to the data from our labor market experiment. The Appendix contains
additional information and robustness analyses for our labor market test, a second application of
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our design approach via a synthetic experiment on Mechanical Turk, and proofs.
2 Related literature
Challenges in designing effective online rating systems are well-documented. To help explain the
empirical inflation findings discussed above, one branch of the literature focuses on how ratings
are given after bad experiences, and in particular conditions under which buyers either don’t leave
a review at all or leave a positive review. On Airbnb, for example, Fradkin et al. (2018) find
that inducing more reviews resulted in more negative reviews, suggesting that those with negative
experiences are less likely to normally submit a review. Though historically this inflation has
been thought of as a strategic response to potential retaliation, recent evidence indicates that
social pressure also plays a role. For example, sellers incentivize reviews (of any kind) by offering
discounts, potentially creating an implicit social obligation for reviewers to reciprocate with a
positive review (Li and Xiao, 2014; Cabral and Li, 2015). Such effects, along with outright fraud
and sellers asking for higher ratings, contribute to rating inflation.
2.1 Platform measures to counter or encourage inflation
Platforms are aware of the inflation problem and have invested in fixing it. Most existing so-
lutions try to decrease retaliatory pressure from sellers or to encourage more buyers to submit
reviews. In 2007, eBay implemented one-sided feedback (i.e., only buyers rating sellers), with
anonymous ratings presented only in aggregate; the platform later eliminated negative buyer rat-
ings altogether (Bolton et al., 2013). Through a test with private feedback, oDesk reports that
such feedback predicts both future private and public feedback better than does public feedback,
and there is evidence that buyers utilize private ratings more than they do public ratings (Filippas
et al., 2018).1 Other work has attempted to align buyer incentives with providing informative
reviews (Gaikwad et al., 2016), but the approach has not yet been widely adopted. Despite such
fixes, the problem of inflation largely remains on online platforms, consistent with the hypothesis
that norms have shifted so that even average experiences are given the top numeric value.
This literature suggests that many initially effective ideas may not have a first order effect in
increasing the informativeness of ratings, especially in the long-term: rating behavior on online
platforms is not static. Filippas et al. (2018) show that inflation happens over time: on the same
online labor market as in our test, average public ratings over a span of nine years went from below
4 stars to about 4.8 stars. This view is consistent with the “disequilibrium” view of rating system
design described by Nosko and Tadelis (2015).
2.2 Survey design and rating inflation in other contexts
Rating inflation and the question of rating system design are also prevalent in other contexts. For
example, grade inflation in education is an oft-recognized issue (Johnson, 2006). Proposed solutions
include include forcing educators to deflate grades (either by assigning quotas to each grade or by
eliciting rankings) or standardizing grades after the fact (Lackey and Lackey, 2006; Blum, 2017).
Similar methods are used to evaluate employees (Shaout and Yousif, 2014) and athletes. In baseball,
for example, scouts rate athletes on a numeric scale that spans from 20 to 80 (Gines, 2017); however,
scouts differ in how they evaluate talent or otherwise have heterogeneous biases, and teams may
1“Public ratings” are shown publicly, non-anonymized, e.g., “A rated B 5 stars.” “Private ratings” are either
shown as a summary statistic, e.g., “B averages 4.6 stars”, or not shown at all and used only internally by the
platform.
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use sophisticated systems to calibrate the information provided by each scout (Reiter, 2018). On
online platforms, in contrast, it may not be desirable to impose ratings quotas on buyers or feasible
to assess the rating ability of individual buyers (though these are interesting avenues for future
work).
An alternate approach to counter grade inflation is adding and labeling rating levels (e.g.,
plus-minus grading, or providing suggested mappings from relative ranking to grade) in order
to behaviorally induce more dispersed grade distributions from educators (Lackey and Lackey,
2006; Blum, 2017). This solution is similar to the well-studied idea of using labels for scales
in survey responses, in which the specific design of rating scales – including the specific words,
number of words, and their positive-negative balance – is known to affect responses (Krosnick, 1999;
Parasuraman et al., 2006; Klockars and Yamagishi, 1988; Hicks et al., 2000). In such solutions, the
raters are not forced or even explicitly asked to answer in a certain manner; rather, the question
and answer choices are presented in a way such that raters naturally behave as the survey designer
wishes them to.
Our behavioral results are consistent with this latter literature, despite the presence of incentive
issues as discussed above: scale design can have a first order effect on the quality of responses in
real rating systems. Although this finding aligns with the survey design literature, as discussed
above our study is preceded by a long line of rating systems literature in which substantive changes
(making ratings private, trying to prevent retaliation, or UI changes) do not in practice lead to
sufficiently informative rating systems. Given the potential costs for giving negative ratings posited
by previous work, it is not clear a priori that any change will induce raters to do so; our work
provides one path forward.
Beyond this behavioral insight, we provide a theoretical framework that a survey designer in any
context can use to pinpoint the most informative design for their setting in a principled manner.
For example, in the Appendix we apply our approach to a setting more similar to standard survey
design and crowd-sourcing, and it yields a non-trivial rating system design that outperforms others.
2.3 Theoretical analyses of ratings
Recent literature has attempted to explain rating behavior, and inflation in particular, through
a variety of models (Immorlica et al., 2010; Cabral and Hortacsu, 2010; Filippas et al., 2018;
Fradkin et al., 2018). Much of this work seeks to understand how buyer incentives may result in
an equilibrium in which they provide with dishonest ratings, or how sellers may be incentivized to
accumulate high ratings and then give low effort. For example, Filippas et al. (2018) posit that high
ratings are unavoidable when sellers are affected by negative ratings, as buyers are incentivized to
incorrectly give positive ratings even after negative experiences.
Several recent works also study the speed of learning in rating systems and other similar con-
texts (Che and Horner, 2015; Johari et al., 2016; Ifrach et al., 2017; Acemoglu et al., 2017; Pa-
panastasiou et al., 2017). In these works, the platform influences which matches occur through its
design, and this affects the learning rates. In contrast, we take the matches as given and show how
the platform can meaningfully design what it learns from each match. Finally, in a related paper,
we consider the optimal design of binary rating systems, for which far more theoretical structure
exists (Garg and Johari, 2019).
3 Online labor market experiment description
Our work focuses on whether we can improve the design of the feedback systems used in online
platforms. As we have noted, the literature suggests that despite substantial effort across a variety
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of platforms, rating behavior has not changed for the better over time: average ratings on platforms
tend to be extremely high or “inflated” (see discussion in Section 2). A significant consequence
of this inflation is that current ratings systems and their resulting distribution of ratings do not
provide information that can effectively and efficiently differentiate high quality participants from
low quality participants.
In this section, we propose a simple but under-explored innovation in the design of a rating
system: using positive-skewed verbal phrases in the rating scale. We study the effect of such a
change through the results of a randomized controlled trial on the rating system of a large online
labor market. In this test, new ratings questions were introduced in a feedback form clients submit
upon finishing a job with a freelancer.
The section is structured as follows. In Section 3.1, we further discuss our motivation and
hypotheses. In Section 3.2, we briefly describe the online labor market. Section 3.3 contains our
method and the treatment conditions. We discuss the results in Section 4; as we show there, our
results demonstrate that our proposed design changes successfully curb rating inflation and lead to
substantially more informative ratings.
3.1 Motivation and hypothesis
We aim to design rating scales for online platforms that lead to more informative ratings. Motivated
in part by the emergence of the rating norms discussed in the introduction, where 5 stars is routinely
considered “average,” we are interested in evaluating the effectiveness of changes that can counter
this norm: in particular, we consider rating scales where the answer choices are positive-skewed,
with specific descriptions attached to each rating.
Our hypothesis is that such positive-skewed scales lead to less “inflated” ratings than standard,
numeric rating scales, and as a result, produce more informative ratings. (By “inflated”, we mean
ratings where a large majority of the rating distribution is on the highest rating score).
This hypothesis is motivated by the idea that raters feel a cost if they are dishonest in their
ratings, and that this cost is an increasing function in how dishonest she perceives herself to be.
Crucially, this quantity would vary both with experience quality and the rating system design.
With standard numeric rating systems and today’s norms, a rater arguably does not consider herself
dishonest for rating mediocre experiences 5/5, because that is what 5 stars has come to mean. On
the other hand, suppose a platform provides explicit guidance on what ratings mean (e.g., “5 stars
means best experience you’ve had”); raters would thus face a higher cost of dishonesty for giving
low quality sellers a high ratings. This hypothesis is consistent with the self-concept maintenance
literature, where people are understood to be more likely to be dishonest when they can convince
themselves that they are acting honestly (Mazar et al., 2008). Models with such costs have been
considered in, e.g., Filippas et al. (2018) and Fradkin et al. (2018).
Finally, note that while our test design allows us to measure the effects of other design changes,
we did not hypothesize any other specific effects (direction or magnitude) a priori, except for the
benefits of positive-skewed rating scales. These alternate design changes let us compare the relative
benefits of possible solutions to the rating inflation problem.
3.2 Empirical context
The test ran on a large, online labor market. In this market, clients seek the services of freelancers
across a variety of categories (e.g., software development, graphic design, and translation). Clients
may choose to contract with a freelancer for a job based on work history, prior ratings, the free-
lancer’s proposal, and potentially an initial conversation. A client-freelancer pair may work on
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multiple jobs together during their time on the platform.
At the end of each job, the client is asked to fill out a feedback form in which they rate the
freelancer’s work through a series of multiple choice and free-form questions. This labor market has
both private and public ratings, and private ratings are aggregated and made available to potential
future clients as part of a freelancer’s public score. Both private and public ratings are high on the
platform: even the average private feedback score is over 8.5/10. See Filippas et al. (2018), which
analyzes ratings over time on the same labor market, for an in-depth description of the status-quo
rating system and its performance.
3.3 Method
We now describe our test method. The authors were involved in test design and analysis of
anonymized data, but not implementation or deployment.
The test added a question to the feedback form given to clients after they close a job. This
question appeared with the current private rating questions and was marked optional. All clients
were still asked the existing private rating questions, including rating the freelancer on a numeric
0− 10 scale. The answer choices were displayed vertically after the question.
The test ran over a 90 day period in Summer 2018, with a pilot in January 2018 over 5 days.
We report the set-up and results of the long test; pilot results are nearly identical.
3.3.1 Treatment conditions
There were six treatment conditions that included an additional question on the feedback form.
The question phrasing and answer choices differed between the treatment conditions. See Table 1
for a detailed list of the treatment conditions. There were four different types of answer choices:
(1) comparing against a client’s expectations (Expectation); (2) descriptive adjectives (Adjectives);
(3) comparing against the average freelancer the client has hired, as well as two variants (Average;
Average, not affect score; Average, randomized); and (4) a numeric scale with no descriptions
attached to the ratings (Numeric).
The non-numeric treatments describe possible ways to design multiple choice rating systems that
add more specificity to the rating scale. The choices themselves are skewed toward the positive end:
each scale has two “negative” choices, one “neutral” choice, and 3 “positive” choices, in increasing
levels of effusiveness. This imbalance was chosen so that (a) clients could give “positive” feedback
to most freelancers while still allowing the platform to disambiguate the very best from others, and
(b) to emphasize that the best ratings should be reserved for the very best freelancers.
The Numeric treatment, giving freelancers the option of giving 0− 5 stars, helps disambiguate
between novelty effects of introducing new questions and the idiosyncratic effects of the question
itself. As in the other treatments, this question is asked in addition to the the existing rating
questions on the site, which include a 0 − 10 overall rating question. Furthermore, the question
phrasing is identical in the Adjectives and Numeric treatments; only the answer choices differ. This
design thus teases out the different effects of the type of question itself and the answer choices.
We include two additional variants as follows: (a) a variant with additional text emphasizing
that the answer will not impact the freelancer’s publicly displayed rating (Average, not affect score),
and (b) a variant where we randomize the order of the answer choices (Average, randomized). The
first variant tests the additional informational gain from clients knowing for certain that a low
rating will not affect the freelancer. The second variant helps assess the propensity of clients to not
read all the answer choices before responding.
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Treatment Additional Question Answer choices
Expectation How did this freelancer compare
to your expectations?
Much worse than I expected, Worse than I expected,
About what I expected, Better than I expected, Far
better than I expected, Beyond what I could have ex-
pected
Adjectives How would you rate this free-
lancer overall?
Terrible, Mediocre, Good, Great, Phenomenal, Best
possible freelancer!
Average How does this freelancer com-
pare to others you have hired?
Worst Freelancer I’ve Hired, Below Average, Average,
Above Average, Well Above Average, Best Freelancer
I’ve Hired
Average,
not affect
score
How does this freelancer com-
pare to others you have hired?
(This will not impact the free-
lancer’s score)
Same as Average group
Average,
random-
ized
How does this freelancer com-
pare to others you have hired?
Same as Average group, but in random order
Numeric How would you rate this free-
lancer overall?
0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5
Table 1: Treatments groups for labor market test
In addition to the six treatments, a Control condition was included, in which no additional
question is asked (replicating the status quo feedback form).
3.3.2 Allocation to treatment groups
Allocation was done at the client level when they first closed a job and landed on the feedback form
after the start of the test. Clients who had closed less than two jobs in the past were excluded,
as several of the treatment conditions ask clients to compare the freelancer to past experiences.
Each treatment condition was allocated 15% of the clients, and the remaining 10% of clients were
allocated to Control. After being allocated to a treatment group, a given client was assigned the
same treatment for the duration of the test and was thus shown the same additional question for
any further jobs she may have closed. (During the pilot in January, 2018, 40% of clients were
allocated to Control and 10% to each treatment condition.)
Due to a bug in the allocation code during the test, 1, 086 out of the 66, 755 clients who
submitted feedback were assigned to different treatment conditions on different closed jobs. We
disregard all such clients in our analysis to eliminate the possibility of contamination between
treatment cells. To confirm experimental validity, we show in the Appendix that otherwise the
randomization was effective: the distribution of clients in different cells are essentially identical on
all observed covariates. This bug does bias the client population in our data in one way, however:
clients who closed more jobs in the test period were more likely to experience the bug, and thus
to be incorrectly assigned to multiple treatment cells. As a consequence, the client population
on which we carry out our analysis skews slightly away from the highest volume clients on the
platform.
3.3.3 Number of responses and data preprocessing
75, 592 unique clients landed on the feedback page, and 66, 755 clients submitted feedback for at
least one job. We remove the clients mistakenly assigned to multiple treatment cells (the bug
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Assigned Submissions Analyzed
Condition Clients Clients Jobs Clients Jobs Mean treatment response
Control 7576 7179 23554 6880 21850 -
Expectation 11271 10073 28880 9718 27156 3.34
Adjectives 11101 9966 28413 9616 26370 3.65
Average 11375 10135 28372 9807 26605 3.76
Average, not affect score 11500 10295 28882 9944 27536 3.78
Average, randomized 11466 10258 28663 9895 26978 3.46
Numeric 11303 10120 32153 9802 27677 4.59
Table 2: Number of clients and jobs in each cell, and mean treatment response
described above), as well as seven clients who were correctly assigned but who closed more than
200 jobs during the test period. Table 2 contains, for each treatment cell, the numbers of clients
assigned, clients who submitted a job, and clients and jobs in our dataset after the pre-processing.
4 Labor market test results
In this section we provide results that demonstrate that the positive-skewed verbal scales reduced
inflation and produced more informative ratings. In Section 4.1 we show the verbal rating scales
result in deflated ratings compared to the numeric scale; we report simple marginal distributions of
the rating choices made by clients in different treatment cells, both overall and across time through-
out the experiment. Then in Section 4.2 we show that such verbal scales are more informative than
the numeric scale: the rating choices made by clients in the verbal treatment cells better correspond
to exogenous signals of a given freelancers quality, in two ways. First, we show that the verbal
scales are more predictive of whether clients tend to rehire a freelancer. Second, we show that the
verbal scales yield ratings that are more strongly correlated with the average rating a freelancer
receives by distinct clients across treatment cells; this latter quantity serves as an empirical proxy
for freelancer “quality”. The resulting approximate joint distributions of freelancer quality and
ratings received motivate our model in the next section, where we develop a measure to compare
rating scales by the joint distributions they induce.
4.1 Verbal rating scales counter inflation
We start our analysis of the results by looking at the marginal rating distributions in each treatment,
i.e., how many freelancers received each possible rating in each treatment cell. These distributions
provide evidence that the non-numeric scales provide more dispersed and deflated ratings. Further-
more, we find that the verbal rating scales are resistant to inflation throughout the course of the
experiment; this surprising finding stands in contrast to prior work on rating inflation over time.
4.1.1 Snapshot analysis of ratings
Figure 1a shows the marginal rating distributions for each treatment group, and Table 2 contains
the mean treatment response in each group, for the entire experiment period. There is a large and
significant difference between the rating distribution from the numeric scale and each of the other
treatment groups. Each treatment cell is different from each of the others at p < 10−100 using the
Kolmogorov-Smirnov two-sample test, except for the Average and Average, not affect score cells,
where p > 0.1. While the Numeric treatment ratings follow the J-curve pattern usually seen in
ratings, the other treatments are far more evenly distributed as desired. Most starkly, 80.6% of
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Figure 1: Labor market test marginal rating distributions. Error bars are 95% boot-strapped
confidence intervals, where the bootstrapped sampling is done at the client level.
ratings on the Numeric scale are 5/5, while at most 35.8% of responses on any other scale received
the highest possible rating.
The substantial effect size of the difference between the Numeric condition and the other treat-
ments confirms our hypothesis that specific and positive-skewed scales are an effective way to
counter inflation: the answer choices presented to the rater are a first-order determinant of rating
behavior. The other changes (emphasizing that the freelancer would not be affected, and random-
izing the choices) have comparatively small effects.
Additional analyses are in the Appendix. In particular, our results there demonstrate that the
findings reported in this section remain essentially identical even if we use other approaches to
the analysis; for example, if we sample only one job per client, if we include all valid clients (i.e.,
including those with more than 200 jobs submitted), or if we even include the invalid incorrectly
allocated clients.
4.1.2 Temporal analysis of ratings
The above analysis provides a snapshot view of what happens when a new question is added to
the rating form. Some of the rating dispersion may be a novelty effect that decreases over time.
As Filippas et al. (2018) emphasize, a substantial component of rating inflation in online platforms
happens over time, on the order of months or even years. Here, we analyze whether ratings on the
new questions inflated in the time period of the test.
We find that the rating scales do not inflate substantially. Figure 1b shows the average rating
per treatment group over the 90 days after the launch of the test, in a sliding window of 7 days.
There is no discernible inflation over time. It is instructive to compare the (lack of) inflationary
trend to the inflation after the launch of a new numeric scale on the same platform in 2007, as
reported by Filippas et al. (2018): average ratings inflated from about 3.8 stars to about 4.1 stars in
the first three months after the system launched. (Note that introducing a new Numeric question
in 2018 yields immediately inflated responses, suggesting that current platform users have been
conditioned to the norm of inflated ratings.)
One concern with drawing conclusions from the preceding analysis over time is that there may
not be enough clients who actually submit multiple jobs during the test period, and so novelty
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effects may still predominate when looking at overall averages. To study this concern, we analyze
the ratings given by the clients who submitted at least 10 ratings each. We then run a regression for
treatment response, with a covariate indicating how many previous jobs the client had submitted
during the test period. Appendix Section A.4 has the associated table and discussion. For such
high-volume clients, inflation exists but is slow: ratings may be inflated by a full point after a client
has given 100 ratings.
Positively, this finding suggests that as long as new clients continue to enter the platform, ratings
should remain deflated over a long time horizon. Indeed, given that existing norms are strongly
biased towards inflationary ratings (as evidenced by clients’ responses to the Numeric question), it
is quite valuable to see no evidence of inflation in the verbal treatment groups within a three month
period. Of course, in principle it remains possible that over a timescale much longer than that of
this test, norms would shift again towards inflated ratings. A longer-term longitudinal analysis
of this type of inflationary behavior remains an important direction for future work in this area,
though of course data collection over such a long time horizon is a significant obstacle.
4.2 Verbal rating scales yield more informative ratings
The analysis above establishes that buyers behave substantially differently with non-numeric rating
scales than they do with the numeric scale, and in particular that such scales produce deflated
ratings. In this section, we establish that this change is beneficial to the platform in terms of
learning about freelancers: that higher “quality” freelancers indeed receive better ratings on average
with the verbal scales, where “quality” is exogenously defined based on signals other than ratings
on the given rating scale of interest.
To do this analysis, however, one needs such an exogenous signal on latent freelancer quality;
such a strong signal is precisely what is missing on many online platforms with inflated rating
systems. In fact, this lack of a signal, especially for new participants on the platform, is the
primary motivation for our work. We provide two approaches to overcome this gap and show that
indeed the verbal rating scales substantially provide more information to the platform. Our second
approach, in particular, provides estimates for the joint distribution of freelancer quality and the
ratings they receive in each scale.
4.2.1 Predicting freelancer rehires
First, we observe that on this labor market, clients often rehire the same freelancers for jobs in the
future. Consistent with the literature, we assume that a client with a more positive experience with
a freelancer is more likely to return to the platform and rehire the freelancer (Nosko and Tadelis,
2015). We thus analyze whether the verbal rating scores provide more predictive power on whether
a freelancer will be rehired. (This measure is not perfect, as there are others reasons that a rehire
may not occur, including that the freelancer does not wish to work with the client. However, the
ratings in our test are private, and so could not have directly exerted this influenced).
For each client-freelancer pair that completed a job during the experiment period, we consider
the rating given by the client to the freelancer on the first such completed job. Across condition
cells (besides Control), there are 125, 386 such first jobs, with 58, 787 unique clients and 110, 798
unique freelancers. We then observe whether the client-freelancer pair completed another contract
during the test time period.
The results imply that the verbal rating scales are substantially more informative than the
numeric scale – even a single rating provides more predictive power to the platform. Figure 2
shows, for each condition, the likelihood that a freelancer given a certain rating is to be eventually
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Figure 2: Likelihood that a client will rehire a freelancer during the time period of the test, given
just the first rating the client gives that freelancer during the test period. Values are normalized by
the overall mean rehire rate. Confidence intervals are 95% intervals with bootstrapped sampling
done at the client level.
rehired by the same client, normalized by the overall mean rehire rate. Clients who gave a freelancer
anything but a “5” on the numeric scale almost never rehired the freelancer. With the positive-
skewed verbal scales, by contrast, there is a smoother decline of rehire rate, giving the platform
finer-grained insight on whether a freelancer is likely to be rehired. Furthermore, top verbal rating
scores better identify truly exceptional freelancers: for example, freelancers are 31.8% more likely
to be rehired after receiving the top rating in the Average treatment than they are after receiving
the top numeric score (1.56x and 1.18x higher than the average rehire rate, respectively). Clients
are providing more information when asked to rate freelancers on the verbal scale.
Note, however, that rehiring data during the test period does not provide enough information
to construct reliable quality estimates for individual freelancers: a given freelancer typically only
matches with a few unique clients and the rehire decision is itself noisy. In the next sub-section,
we construct such freelancer-level quality estimates by looking at freelancer ratings across cells.
4.2.2 Correlation with estimated freelancer quality
In this section, we estimate each freelancer’s quality and use this estimate to construct a joint
distribution of estimated freelancer quality and ratings under a given scale. We then use this joint
distribution to compare different designs.
Recall that in our experiment design, a given client is only in a single treatment cell throughout
the test period. On the other hand, a given freelancer may complete jobs with and receive ratings
from clients across treatment cells. Thus the ratings any individual freelancer receives in different
treatment cells are independent.
We can leverage this independence to construct approximate joint distributions of freelancer
quality and ratings in each treatment cell as follows. For a given treatment cell, we consider all
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Figure 3: Joint distributions of freelancer quality vs. ratings in the Average and Numeric treatment
cells, respectively. Low, Medium, and High quality sellers refer to those with other cell average
ratings in [0, 2), [2.5, 3.5) and [4.5, 5], respectively. The Y axis is the probability that a freelancer
of a given quality receives a rating at least as high as the X axis. Confidence intervals are 95%
intervals with bootstrapped sampling done at the client level.
freelancers who received at least three ratings in the other treatment cells, and we estimate a
freelancer’s quality via a simple average of these ratings. For each given treatment cell, these
estimates of quality are exogenous with respect to the ratings received in that cell. For each
treatment cell, we then construct a joint distribution over freelancers of the rating received in that
cell, and the estimated quality of that freelancer.
We note that given the amount of data we had available, our estimates of these joint distributions
are noisy. The freelancer quality estimates are only from about three ratings across the various
treatment cells, and responses in the cells themselves differ in meaning. In practice, a platform with
access to historical performance data across a longer time-period, especially for long-lived sellers,
may be able to construct more reliable estimates.
Figure 3 includes two such joint distributions, for the Average and Numeric treatments, respec-
tively. The Appendix contains the same joint distribution for the other treatment cells; we also
show another way to group freelancers by their average ratings, and similar patterns emerge. In all
treatment cells, higher quality freelancers receive better ratings, though to varying degrees.
In the Numeric cell, most freelancers receive high ratings independent of quality, and it may
be difficult to distinguish high and medium quality freelancers. In contrast, in the Average cell
there is a larger gap between freelancers of different quality, and qualitatively one expects that this
gap is beneficial in terms of learning freelancer quality. In this sense, the Average cell is providing
ratings that are more informative than the Numeric cell.
4.3 Discussion
These results suggest that there are countervailing forces to ratings inflation that can induce ratings
to be more dispersed than in existing systems, by shifting how buyers interpret the scale: a platform
can find large improvements over standard rating systems by explicitly defining what each rating
means and positive-skewing such descriptions. In particular, though ratings still tend positive in
absolute terms in our verbal scales (over 80% of freelancers receive Above Average or better), clients
seem hesitant to give most freelancers the best possible score when such a score is interpreted as
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truly exceptional. This deflationary effect has positive information implications for the platforms.
For example, freelancers who receive such a rating are more likely to be rehired by the platform.
Furthermore, this large effect is first order and dwarfs other sources of rating variation on
the labor market. For example, in the Appendix we show that rating heterogeneity across market
segments is small, on the order of 0.1 differences in means. Similarly, the treatment with randomized
answer choices reveals that clients tend to pick the first choice presented more than others, but
again the effect is second order.
We conclude by noting that our qualitative assessment of the joint distribution of estimated
quality and ratings in Section 4.2.2 is somewhat ad hoc. Motivated by this work, in the next section
we develop a quantitative approach to capture the performance gain of verbal rating scales, based
on the joint distribution of estimated quality and observed ratings. In particular, we compare
rating system designs in terms of the speed at which they allow the platform to correctly rank the
freelancers.
5 A framework to compare rating scales
The preceding section establishes, through a variety of metrics, that a platform can improve the
information obtained through the rating system through careful choice of the descriptions for each
level of a multi-level rating scale. This finding naturally prompts the question: is there a principled
way to compare rating scale designs to find the one that is “best” for the platform? We now develop
a framework to do so.
In particular, we take the perspective that the platform’s objective is to ensure that the ranking
of sellers based on their aggregate rating score converges to the true ranking at the fastest rate
possible in the number of ratings received. We develop a stylized model to formalize this notion
and use it to develop an approach to compare and optimize rating systems. The stylized model
we consider has the following key elements. We assume that buyers enter per time period and
match with long-lived sellers, potentially at varying rates according to the seller’s quality. After
the match, the buyer rates the seller; the rating behavior depends on the rating scale (answer
choices, e.g., the adjectives or other answer phrasings in Table 1). The platform’s design levers are
the answer choices making up the rating scale, and the scores it attaches to those adjectives. We
leverage this stylized model to propose an approach to maximize the rate of convergence (in a large
deviations sense) of the estimated ranking based on sellers’ aggregate scores, to the true underlying
ranking based on sellers’ qualities. We apply this methodology to our labor market data (presented
in Section 5.3), and to a synthetic dataset collected through Amazon Mechanical Turk (presented
in the Appendix).
5.1 Model
Our model is constructed to emphasize the platform’s learning rate of participants through its
rating system. It is deliberately stylized so that we can derive a relatively straightforward method
to compare and optimize rating scales. The key components are as follows.
Time. Time is discrete: k = 0, 1, 2, . . ..
Sellers. The system consists of a unit mass of sellers, each associated with a quality type θ,
which is (initially) unknown to the platform. We assume θ is drawn independently and uniformly
at random from a finite and totally ordered set Θ, with |Θ| = M . We use θi to denote the ith
element of Θ within this order, for 0 ≤ i < M .
In addition, each seller has an aggregate score, described further below; we let xk(θ) denote the
aggregate reputation score of the seller of type θ at time k.
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Rating accumulation. Sellers accumulate ratings over time by matching with buyers. At
each time step, each seller matches with at most a single buyer. We make one key assumption that
drives the accumulation of ratings: in particular, that sellers of higher quality are more likely to be
matched. We consider an analysis that is asymptotic in the number of ratings received by sellers
and so we model this visibility benefit by assuming that sellers of higher quality accumulate ratings
at a faster rate. In particular, we assume the existence of a nondecreasing match function g(θ),
where a seller of type θ receives nk(θ) = bkg(θ)c matches, and thus ratings, up to time k.
Our approach to modeling rating accumulation is stylized in at least two important ways. First,
the matching function is artificial: in general, sellers are more likely to match when they have a
higher observed aggregate score, and there may be other heterogeneity as well. Second, we suppose
all sellers have the same age: at time k, all sellers have had k opportunities to match with buyers.
In reality, of course, sellers have different ages on a marketplace. These choices allow us to develop a
clean approach to optimizing the learning rate; we discuss the consequences further in our empirical
investigation in Section 5.3.
Ratings. How are sellers rated? After each match, the seller receives a rating in the form of a
multiple choice question answered by the buyer. The platform makes two decisions at the beginning
when designing this question. First, the platform chooses a rating scale Y , composed of an ordered
set of answer choices y ∈ Y from which the buyer will choose.
Second, whenever a seller receives a rating y ∈ Y , the platform gives the seller a score φ(y) ∈
[0, 1] depending only on the rating received. The score represents the relative positivity assigned to
a rating y: high scores positively affect the seller’s aggregate score (as we formally describe below).
Platforms often use equally spaced scores when translating rater’s choices to an aggregate score
(e.g., the choice “5 stars” translates to a numeric 5 when averaging, the choice “4 stars” translates
to a numeric 4 when averaging, etc.), but we allow the possibility that this choice should also be
optimized.
At each rating opportunity (i.e., match made), the seller receives a rating from the set Y ,
and we assume that this rating depends only on the true quality of the seller. In particular, we
presume that, given scale Y , the probability a seller of type θ receives a rating y is ρ(θ, y|Y ),
with corresponding cumulative mass function R(θ, y|Y ) reflecting the probability a seller of type θ
receives a rating y or higher. In other words, the scale Y induces a joint distribution between the
underlying seller quality and the rating choices buyers make. We make the natural assumptions
that R(θ, y|Y ) is strictly increasing in θ and strictly decreasing with y.
Let y0(θ), y1(θ), y2(θ), . . . be the sequence of ratings received by the seller of type θ. The
aggregate score up to time k of this seller is the average score from ratings received:
xk(θ) =
1
nk(θ)
nk(θ)∑
`=0
φ(y`(θ)). (1)
(We presume x0(θ) = 0 for all θ.) Since φ(y) ∈ [0, 1] for all y, the score xk also lies in [0, 1].
This rating behavior is also a strong assumption. In particular, it does not capture heterogeneity
across raters (the types of sellers a buyer matches with may correlate with the buyer’s rating
behavior in general). Including such heterogeneity is a direction for future work, and we discuss it
further in the conclusion Section 6; indeed, empirical identification of such heterogeneity presents
an interesting practical challenge.
System state. We represent the state of the system defined above by a joint distribution
µk(Θ, X), which gives the mass of sellers of type θ ∈ Θ with aggregate score xk(θ) ∈ X at time
k. Throughout our model presentation, we describe the system model as one emerging from in-
teractions between individual buyers and sellers. However, we assume a unit mass of sellers (and
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some mass of buyers), and so all such descriptions should be viewed as illuminating the evolution
of a joint distribution µk(Θ, X) of the types of sellers on the platform and their current scores. To
formally describe the evolution of µk, let Ek = {θ : nk(θ) = nk−1(θ) + 1}. These are the sellers who
receive an additional rating at time k; for all θ ∈ Eck, nk(θ) = nk−1(θ). Next, for each x, x′ ∈ [0, 1],
define χk(x, x
′, θ|Y, φ) as:
χk(x, x
′, θ|Y, φ) ={y : nk(θ)x− nk−1(θ)x′ = φ(y)}.
The set χ describes the rating(s) a seller of type θ at time k with aggregate score x′ can receive to
transition to aggregate score x. We then have:
µk+1(Θ, X) =
∫
Ek
∫ 1
0
∫
X
∑
y∈χk(θ,x,x′|Y,φ)
ρ(θ, y|Y )dxµk(dθ, dx′) +
∫
Eck
∫
X
µk(dθ, dx
′).
It is straightforward but tedious to check that the preceding dynamics are well defined, given our
primitives.
Platform objective. We assume that the platform wants the ranking of sellers by observed
aggregate score to reflect the underlying true quality ranking as closely as possible.
Formally, given θ1 > θ2, define Pk(θ1, θ2) as follows:
Pk(θ1, θ2) = µk(xk(θ1) > xk(θ2)|θ1, θ2)− µk(xk(θ1) < xk(θ2)|θ1, θ2). (2)
This expression captures the “errors” made by the ranking according to observed score. In partic-
ular, when θ1 > θ2 but xk(θ1) < xk(θ2), the aggregate score ranking swaps the ordering of sellers
θ1 and θ2. Thus, a good rating system has large Pk(θ1, θ2).
We consider the problem of maximizing the following objective, a scaled version of Kendall’s τ
rank correlation between the estimated ranking of sellers and the true ranking:
Wk =
2
M(M − 1)
∑
θ1>θ2∈Θ
Pk(θ1, θ2) (3)
The coefficient ensures that Wk remains bounded even as M increases. This objective depends on
the model primitives R (rater behavior) and g (matching rates), as well as the platform’s decisions
Y (levels) and φ (score).
We note that, in this model, the goal of the rating system is to accurately rank sellers by quality.
Another approach may be to directly optimize for total platform revenue or aggregate welfare. This
approach would require primarily optimizing which matches occur, a focus of many other works. We
optimize information gained per match, for which finding the true ranking of sellers is a reasonable
objective. One observation in support of this choice is that the “deliverable” for the ratings team
in an online platform company is typically an accurate rating that can be an input to models
used by other teams throughout the organization. Further, in a model where matching rates are
exogenously determined by quality, we conjecture that optimizing other objectives (accuracy and
revenue) would produce qualitatively similar results.
Learning R(θ, y|Y ). We note that our approach to quantify the learning rate, which we develop
in the next subsection, requires the platform to learn the rating joint distribution R(θ, y|Y ) for
various potential rating scales Y . In our analysis of the labor market experiment, we provide one
approach to do so — using the data collected during the experiment itself to estimate seller qualities
θ. In practice, a platform with access to more historical data may rely on estimates of θ for a group
of “known” sellers; e.g., these may be long-lived sellers on the platform. The platform can then
test new rating scales, and use the resulting data to estimate R.
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5.2 Quantifying design performance via convergence rate
As noted above, the platform has two design choices it makes: the set of rating levels Y , and the
score function φ. We now consider an approximate approach to maximization of the objective Wk,
by appropriate choice of Y and φ.
No single choice of Y and φ can simultaneously optimize Wk for all k: some designs may be
effective in separating the best sellers from the worst quickly, but then never separate all sellers.
Further, as long as φ(y) is strictly increasing, then because R(θ, y) is strictly increasing in θ, we
have, for all θ1 6= θ2, and all choices of Y and φ: limk→∞ Pk(θ1, θ2) = 1. Using the bounded
convergence theorem we conclude that limk→∞Wk = 1, independent of the design choice Y and φ.
Thus any design asymptotically – with enough ratings – recovers the true ranking of sellers.
For these reasons, we focus on maximization of the rate at which Wk converges; we call the
design (Y, φ) that maximizes this rate optimal. We use a large deviations approach to study the rate
of convergence (Dembo and Zeitouni, 2010), following other works that adopt this approach (Glynn
and Juneja, 2004; Garg and Johari, 2019).
We have the following result.
Theorem 1.
r , − lim
k→∞
1
k
log(1−Wk) = min
0≤i<M
inf
a∈R
{g(θi+1)I(a|θi+1) + g(θi)I(a|θi)} (4)
where I(a|θ) = supz{za − Λ(z|θ)}, and Λ(z|θ) = log
∑
y∈Y ρ(θ, y|Y ) exp(zφ(y)) is the log moment
generating function of a single rating given to seller of type θ.
The proof follows from standard results in large deviations analysis and is in the Appendix.
The expression in (4) is called the large deviations rate for W k. The theorem shows that
Wk(θ1, θ2) → 1 exponentially fast, and provides an explicit relationship between our choice of Y
and φ, and the corresponding exponent. In other words, 1−Wk = O(e−rkpoly(k)).
Two rating systems can be compared by their respective learning rates: for each design, simply
calculate their rates and then compare. The rate function can be calculated numerically given
R(·|Y ), φ and g(θ): in particular, observe that supz{za − Λ(z|θ)} is a concave maximization
problem in z, and infa∈R {g(θi+1)I(a|θi+1) + g(θi)I(a|θi)} is a convex minimization problem in a.
Our design optimization problem is thus as follows: choose Y and φ to maximize the large devi-
ations rate r in (4). We suggest the following approach, supposing the platform has a collection of
candidate scales {Yp}. First, experiment with each scale Yp and estimate R(θ, y|Yp) and g(θ). Then
use the following brute force approach to optimization: for each Yp, choose a random, increasing set
of scores φ(y) ∈ [0, 1],∀y ∈ Yp in each iteration, and calculate the learning rate. For each candidate
scale Yp, run a large (exponential in |Yp|) number of such iterations. Finally, choose the design
Yp, φ with the best learning rate. While this is a brute force optimization, we envision a platform
will not be changing the rating system design very frequently, and thus computation time is not
critical.
Qualitatively, φ(y) should be large if higher quality freelancers are much more likely to receive a
rating choice of at least y than are lower quality freelancers. If the rating joint distribution R(θ, y|Y )
is such that no such choice y exists, then the scale Y will perform poorly in separating the sellers.
In particular, rating scales with inflated responses are uninformative for this reason: every seller
independent of quality is likely to receive the most positive rating choice, and so nothing separates
low quality from high quality sellers. Similarly, a φ that does not reward sellers for receiving rare,
positive ratings, is suboptimal.
Finally, we note that the two parts of the design – scale Y and score mapping φ – differ in
their visibility to raters. Scale Y is presented to raters in order to induce a certain desirable rating
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Learning rates
Condition Naive φ Optimal φ
Expectations 0.022 0.024
Adjectives 0.021 0.027
Average 0.023 0.026
Average, not affect score 0.013 0.014
Average, randomized 0.014 0.019
Numeric 0.009 0.009
(a) Large deviation learning rates.
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(b) Simulated performance of each rating scale.
Figure 4: We apply and test our design approach using experimental data from our online labor
market. Large deviation rates are calculated using Equation (4) and the joint distributions gen-
erated in Section 4.2. Optimal for each treatment corresponds to the highest learning rate among
many random scores.
behavior R(·|Y ). On the other hand, a platform need not share the mapping φ, which is simply
a technical tool that maximally leverages aggregate rating behavior to form an internal ranking
of sellers. The platform may then choose to share statistics about sellers to buyers, for example
whether a seller is in the top 25%. The optimal information sharing procedure is a question tackled
by other work (Papanastasiou et al., 2017; Ifrach et al., 2017; Acemoglu et al., 2017).
5.3 Application to the online labor market
We now follow the design approach outlined above using the empirical R(·|Yp) calculated in Sec-
tion 4.2.2 for each scale Yp in the test. For simplicity, we assume a uniform search rate g(θ) = 1
for all θ; the simulation results are robust to this choice.
5.3.1 Large deviation learning rates for each design
First, we calculate the large deviation rates for each treatment scale, assuming equally spaced
scores φ = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. All of the verbal treatments have larger learning rates than the Numeric
treatment, as shown in Figure 4a.
Next, we optimize the scores φ for each of the scales. Figure 4a also contains the learning rate
achieved by the corresponding optimal score function for each treatment. It suggests that picking
the correct labels on the scale is the first order determinant of the rating system’s performance,
while the optimal scores are second order.
The optimal scores themselves (in Appendix Table 5) reflect the corresponding joint distribu-
tions. For example in the Numeric scale, only the frequency of receiving the top rating distinguishes
freelancers; thus freelancers receive a lesser score (3.45/5, versus ≈ 4/5) for the second-highest rat-
ing in that scale versus in the verbal rating scales.
Note that perhaps because our estimation procedure on the joint distribution is noisy, the
Average and Average, not affect score treatments differ in their joint distributions and learning
rates, even though they have identical marginal distributions and rehire rates.
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5.3.2 Simulated market performance of each design
Finally, we simulate a market for each of the treatment conditions as follows, in order to compare
how the scales perform.
In our simulation, there are 500 sellers with i.i.d. quality in {Low, Medium, High}. There are
100 buyers, each of which matches uniformly at random to a unique seller per time period. In
other words, matching is not independent across sellers, and each seller can only match once per
time period; each seller matches approximately once every 5 time periods. The buyers rate the
sellers according to the joint distributions calculated in Section 4.2.2. Ratings are converted to
scores according to the optimal score function for each treatment. All sellers enter the market at
time k = 0 and do not leave. After each time period, the sellers are ranked according to their
average scores. The true ranking of sellers (i.e., Low < Medium < High) is also constructed. We
then calculate the Kendall’s τ rank distance (not counting sellers tied according to true quality)
between the two lists.
Figure 4b shows the mean (across many simulations) ranking errors over time for each treatment
system as described. The plot and corresponding learning rates for each treatment demonstrate
that even though large deviations rates are an asymptotic quantity, they effectively predict the
performance of each rating scale even for small horizons. The Numeric treatment in particular
learns the ranking of sellers at a much slower rate than do the other mechanisms, both in terms of
learning rate and simulated performance.
In Appendix Figure 9, we show other simulations and analyses as robustness checks. First, we
show performance over time when each seller independently leaves the market with probability .01
at the end of each time k, with a new seller with no reputation score taking her place; such entry
and exit does not affect the comparative performance of each rating scale. Robustness to such
entry and exist further suggests that designed scales will outperform others when only sellers’ most
recent ratings are used, in order to facilitate and reflect seller improvement, cf. (Aperjis and Johari,
2010).
Next, we compare learning with equally spaced vs. optimal φ; as suggested by the learning
rates, calculating an optimal φ has a small but noticeable effect in performance.
Finally in Appendix B, we repeat the analysis for a synthetic setting on Mechanical Turk that
demonstrates the utility of our methods for survey contexts beyond ratings on online platforms.
We find that superficially similar scales may perform dramatically differently in a way that is not
a priori knowable before conducting an experiment and calculating learning rates. We evaluate
performance of each treatment scale on new data not used for scale optimization and find that
performance improvements can transfer to a deployment.
6 Conclusion and discussion
In this work, we study the the design of informative rating systems. We demonstrate through a
field test on a large online labor platform that there can be substantial benefit to changing answer
choices and question phrasing in a rating scale. In particular, we observe that (1) it is possible to
choose a design of the verbal descriptions attached to answer choices present in the rating system
that lead to deflated ratings, and (2) that these ratings are much more informative than ratings
obtained in standard numeric rating systems. Motivated by this finding, we develop a technical
framework to compare and design the scales by properly choosing the answer choices available to
raters and the mapping of these choices to scores. We show that applying this framework can lead
to designs that appear to substantially outperform ad hoc choice of the rating scale. We believe this
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work provides a foundation for a much more systematic approach to the design of rating systems,
and that it has direct practical guidance for platforms to build more informative systems.
6.1 Challenges, opportunities, and limitations
Fraud in online reviews and ratings Our results establish that verbal rating scales can ef-
fectively counter behavioral norms and implicit pressures to provide maximally positive ratings.
However, such scales do not constrain rater behavior and thus are ineffective against inflation
caused by ratings fraud, in which the seller may fake transactions and rate themselves. There
is a large literature on the prevalence of such fraud and techniques to detect it (Hu et al., 2011;
Akoglu et al., 2013; Zhang et al., 2013; Hooi et al., 2016; Luca and Zervas, 2016). Our work is
complementary to such approaches and is most appropriate for markets where such fraud is not the
first order determinant of rating inflation, such as on the labor market in question (as evidenced
by the informative verbal scales).
Horizontal vs. vertical differentiation In many markets, buyers have heterogeneous pref-
erences over sellers, i.e., there is horizontal differentiation. Our work assumes that there is an
underlying ranking of sellers, i.e., that sellers are vertically differentiated (at least among the buy-
ers who match with a given seller). If the matching process segments the market, then vertical
differentiation may dominate within each segment. For example, price and location may segment
the market on AirBnB such that only consumers with similar preferences match with and rate a
given host. Then, a single rating scale can be used if rating behavior is similar across segments
(recall that we show in Section 4.3 that scales perform similarly across segments in our labor mar-
ket). In markets with substantial horizontal differentiation (even given that a buyer and seller have
matched), however, the methods in this work can be used either (1) with comparatively objective
questions (e.g., rating cleanliness or timeliness), where there may be vertical differentiation; or (2)
alongside techniques that detect heterogeneous preferences and create “virtual” market segments
(when feasible). In particular, our work is applicable wherever rating scales are used under the
assumption of some degree of vertical differentiation.
International markets One potential difficulty in implementing verbal rating scales is that they
must be designed in each language, and people in different cultures may interpret the same scale
differently. This difficulty is especially acute as modern online platforms often operate globally.
We note that verbal scales provide an opportunity as well as a challenge. There is variation across
cultures in numeric rating systems, both for response scales in general and for online platforms
in particular (Chen et al., 1995; Hamamura et al., 2008; Koh et al., 2010; Wang et al., 2015).
In the status quo, the platform is left without a mechanism through which it can equalize the
rating distributions. On the other hand, with verbal rating scales, if comparable ratings across
regions are important, the platform can choose scales for each region that provide comparable
rating distributions.
Using ratings for search and matching Another potential concern is that at the moment
the answers to these questions are not used on the platform for other functions, such as search
or matching. As illustrated by Filippas et al. (2018), some inflation for private questions is to be
expected once the answers start affecting freelancers, even if freelancers cannot directly identify
the client who provided any specific rating (e.g., if freelancers start asking for higher ratings on
this question). We cannot completely eliminate this concern and leave the question for future work
after a treatment condition is chosen to be implemented permanently on the platform. However,
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note that the marginal rating distributions and relation to how often freelancers are rehired by a
client are extremely similar for the Average, and Average, not affect score conditions: either the
clients already are aware that the question they are answering is a test question that will not affect
freelancers, or this additional information does not substantially influence how clients rate beyond
the deflating effects of the answer choices in question.
Switching to a new rating system One final practical concern with introducing a new rating
system with drastically different behavior is that it may be challenging from a data integrity
perspective: how can old, inflated ratings be compared to the new ratings, and how can models
throughout the platform be adjusted to handle both types of ratings? In some settings, such as
our large online labor market, the new system can simply co-exist with the status quo: multiple
questions can be asked in the rating form until enough time has passed with the new system
such that older, inflated data is no longer useful. This approach adds friction in the form of
additional work for clients, but it may be a price worth temporarily paying for finer resolution
information. On other platforms where typically users are only asked one question, the transition
may be more challenging. However, such platforms have begun experimenting with their rating
systems. Furthermore, ratings data typically grows stale, as sellers enter and exit the platform or
improve over time, and platforms often only use the last few ratings given to each seller (Aperjis
and Johari, 2010). Such factors mitigate the cost of switching to a new system.
6.2 Future work
Platform goals Rating systems should reflect the specific goals and context of a platform. On
some platforms, it may be undesirable to attempt to fully recover the ranking of sellers. For
example, platforms that provide a commodified experience (e.g., ridesharing or delivery services)
may only care about identifying bad actors on the platform. In this setting for example, asking
buyers to rate sellers against the “average” may place undesirable, excessive pressure on sellers
to attempt to distinguish themselves. Rather, the platform should potentially encourage raters to
give good ratings unless something truly bad happened. Platforms in practice already do this; for
example, when a passenger rates a driver 4 stars out of 5, Lyft describes the choice as “OK, could
have been better.”
The methods in this work are most appropriate in settings where true differentiation exists
between items or sellers (whether this differentiation is under the control of sellers or not), and it
is desirable to identify and encourage comparatively high performers. Future work should closely
examine the practical and theoretical relationships between a platform’s informational goals and its
rating system design. We take a theoretical step in this direction in our work on designing binary
rating systems (Garg and Johari, 2019).
Dynamic design and combating inflation over time Even with our non-inflated rating
scales, it may be possible that over time norms shift so that again ratings become inflated. In this
event, optimization of comparison points and rating scales may need to be a dynamic process for
a platform. An important direction for future research is to consider a dynamic equilibrium view
of rating system design. In particular, online marketplaces and platforms should aim to design
systems that are naturally robust to inflation yet provide an good user experience. A complete
picture should consider how search, buyer rating behavior, and seller behavior may change in
response to changes in the rating system. Capturing these short- and long-run equilibrium effects
remain important challenges. We believe our work provides an important empirical and theoretical
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building block in this direction, by suggesting that the meaning raters attach to levels of a scale
can substantially influence the quality of information obtained by the platform.
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A Further analysis of the labor market test
In this section, we report more detail from the test on the online labor market. For much of this
section, we analyze a subset of the jobs: some job covariate information is missing in what was
given to us by the labor market. We have full covariate data for 100438 jobs (out of 184172).
A.1 Verifying randomization in allocation of clients
As noted in Section 3.3.2 of the main paper, there was a bug in the allocation code such that 1, 086
clients were assigned to different treatment cells upon submissions of different jobs. Since this could
potentially create contamination between our cells, we disregard these clients in our analysis. Here
we make sure that neither this bug nor any other affected experimental validity by checking the
distribution of client covariates across the treatment cells. We do so as follows.
We have a set of job level covariates for a subset of the jobs: hourly rate of job (if applicable),
total cost of project if not hourly (if applicable), previous number of closed jobs by client at time
of job, previous spend by client at time of job, value of the job (4 options), Tier 1 category (12
options), Tier 2 category (88 options), and expertise level (3 options). The first four are continuous
covariates, and the last 4 are categorical covariates.
For each client, we sample one of that client’s jobs and associate the client with that job’s
covariates. Then we run tests of independence for the samples of each covariate across the treatment
cells. Across a variety of tests and all covariates, the results are consistent with the randomization
being valid.
• For each continuous covariate, using the Kruskal-Wallis H-test for independent samples on
all the treatment groups together, the null hypothesis that the population median of all of
the groups are equal is not rejected, with p > .9.
• Similarly, for each continuous covariate, using the one way ANOVA F test, the null hypothesis
that all the treatment groups have the same population mean is not rejected, with p > .2.
• For each categorical covariate, we run the chi-squared test of independence of variables in a
contingency table, which tests whether the observed frequencies of values is independent of
the treatment group. The null hypothesis is not rejected with p > .1, for each covariate.
These tests are consistent with fact that the allocation of valid clients we used for analysis
across treatment cells was truly random. Note that these tests do not check whether the invalid
clients (which we threw out) are similar to the valid clients. Invalid clients are more likely to be
higher volume clients, as those who submitted many jobs during the test period provided more
chances for the bug to manifest.
A.2 Robustness against high volume clients and allocation bug
Recall that in the main text we further threw out the 7 clients who submitted more than 200 jobs
during the test period (“heavy users”). However, the following may still be the case: idiosyncratic
rating behavior of medium-volume clients (over 50 or 100 jobs submitted) may be driving the
difference in behavior between treatment cells. Here we show that this is not the case, as well as
the fact that throwing out the 7 heavy users was not consequential. We further show that including
the clients who were thrown out due to the allocation bug does not materially affect results.
In Figure 5, we plot the rating distributions when only sampling 1 job/client, including 7 clients
excluded for submitting at least 200 jobs during the test period, and using all jobs and clients (even
incorrectly allocated clients). The mean treatment responses are also included. Results are similar.
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(c) Using all clients and jobs
Figure 5: Rating distributions for different client sampling techniques. As in the main text, the
confidence intervals are 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals, with bootstrapped sampling at the
client level.
Data sampling policy: From main text One job per client With outlier clients All clients, even incorrectly allocated
Expectations 3.339 3.243 3.354 3.350
Adjectives 3.650 3.597 3.650 3.651
Average 3.763 3.687 3.788 3.774
Average, not affect score 3.777 3.693 3.777 3.771
Average, Randomized 3.465 3.438 3.463 3.458
Numeric 3.594 4.534 4.635 4.639
Table 3: Average treatment responses under different data policies
A.3 Regressing treatment response with treatment cell and other covariates
We regress the treatment response with treatment cell and all of our job covariates (except tier 2
category, which had 88 unique values and is a more granular version of tier 1 category). (Note:
to maintain full rank, each categorical covariate is encoded such that one of the levels is missing,
except for treatment cell, and there is no intercept. As a result, the treatment cell coefficients
cannot be interpreted as treatment means – they are the treatment means conditional on a specific
value of each of the categorical covariates and of 0 for the continuous variables). Further note
that for simplicity, we only include one set of interaction terms: treatment cell vs. the number of
previous treatment responses. Finally, note that the displayed standard errors are cluster-robust
standard errors where each client is a cluster, to take into account that ratings given by the same
client are correlated. We learn several things from this regression, displayed in Table 4:
• There is some heterogeneity in ratings across the job covariates, but on the order of .1 points
on the average rating. This heterogeneity is dwarfed by the differences between the treatment
cells, especially the numeric vs. non-numeric treatments. This relative lack of heterogeneity
further supports that the differences between the mean treatment responses are not due to
randomness caused by some types of jobs being more present in some treatment groups than
others.
• We can directly measure the effect of the number of previous jobs during that testing period
a given client has submitted, i.e., estimate the inflation that will result over time as clients
submit additional jobs.
From the table below, each additional job a client has submitted raises the treatment response
for the Expectations and the Averages treatments, on the order of .008 to .014 points per
previous response. At this rate, these coefficients suggest that only after giving 100 ratings
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would a client inflate ratings by an average of between .8 and 1.4 points. The Numeric
treatment cell does not further inflate substantially.
Dep. Variable: treatment-response R-squared: 0.128
Model: OLS Adj. R-squared: 0.128
Method: Least Squares Log-Likelihood: -1.6001e+05
No. Observations: 100438 AIC: 3.201e+05
Df Residuals: 100406 BIC: 3.204e+05
Df Model: 31
coef std err z P>|z| [0.025 0.975]
treatment cell[1] 3.0596 0.062 49.052 0.000 2.937 3.182
treatment cell[2] 3.3965 0.063 53.862 0.000 3.273 3.520
treatment cell[3] 3.4516 0.062 55.353 0.000 3.329 3.574
treatment cell[4] 3.4414 0.062 55.796 0.000 3.321 3.562
treatment cell[5] 3.1887 0.062 51.379 0.000 3.067 3.310
treatment cell[6] 4.3745 0.062 70.044 0.000 4.252 4.497
value group[T.lv] 0.1031 0.034 2.998 0.003 0.036 0.170
value group[T.mv] 0.0206 0.034 0.601 0.548 -0.047 0.088
value group[T.vlv] 0.2920 0.032 9.061 0.000 0.229 0.355
category group[T.Admin Support] -0.0591 0.046 -1.281 0.200 -0.150 0.031
category group[T.Customer Service] -0.1070 0.081 -1.320 0.187 -0.266 0.052
category group[T.Data Science & Analytics] 0.1177 0.050 2.354 0.019 0.020 0.216
category group[T.Design & Creative] 0.1077 0.042 2.581 0.010 0.026 0.189
category group[T.Engineering & Architecture] 0.1235 0.058 2.122 0.034 0.009 0.238
category group[T.IT & Networking] 0.1277 0.049 2.595 0.009 0.031 0.224
category group[T.Legal] 0.0643 0.061 1.047 0.295 -0.056 0.185
category group[T.Sales & Marketing] -0.0869 0.045 -1.920 0.055 -0.176 0.002
category group[T.Translation] 0.0405 0.060 0.676 0.499 -0.077 0.158
category group[T.Web, Mobile & Software Dev] 0.0940 0.042 2.256 0.024 0.012 0.176
category group[T.Writing] -0.1158 0.044 -2.638 0.008 -0.202 -0.030
expertise tier[T.Expert/Expensive] 0.1465 0.020 7.276 0.000 0.107 0.186
expertise tier[T.Intermediate] 0.0582 0.018 3.306 0.001 0.024 0.093
hr charge 1.376e-05 2.16e-06 6.376 0.000 9.53e-06 1.8e-05
fp charge 3.64e-05 6.73e-06 5.409 0.000 2.32e-05 4.96e-05
log(1 +client prev spend) -0.0069 0.006 -1.156 0.248 -0.018 0.005
log(1 +num prev asg) -0.0177 0.010 -1.769 0.077 -0.037 0.002
treatment cell[1]:# prev. treatment resps. by client 0.0080 0.004 2.042 0.041 0.000 0.016
treatment cell[2]:# prev. treatment resps. by client -0.0043 0.006 -0.675 0.500 -0.017 0.008
treatment cell[3]:# prev. treatment resps. by client 0.0085 0.003 2.850 0.004 0.003 0.014
treatment cell[4]:# prev. treatment resps. by client 0.0141 0.003 5.468 0.000 0.009 0.019
treatment cell[5]:# prev. treatment resps. by client 0.0024 0.005 0.485 0.628 -0.007 0.012
treatment cell[6]:# prev. treatment resps. by client 0.0010 0.004 0.246 0.806 -0.007 0.009
Omnibus: 11064.189 Durbin-Watson: 1.911
Prob(Omnibus): 0.000 Jarque-Bera (JB): 15421.891
Skew: -0.876 Prob(JB): 0.00
Kurtosis: 3.785 Cond. No. 9.60e+04
Table 4: OLS Regression Results with covariate for previous number of treatment responses
A.4 More on inflation over time
The interpretations above suffer from selection bias: the set of clients who submit 10 jobs in the
test period are a different cohort than those who submit fewer. This effect is partially captured by
the term containing the previous number of client assignments. To address this issue, we repeat
the regression in Table 4, limiting the analysis to those clients who have more than ten treatment
responses during the test period (all of which have the job covariates). The table is ommitted; the
coefficients for inflation over time are largely the same.
To further help visualize (the relative lack of) inflation over the number of submitted ratings,
Figure 6 shows the mean ratings for each treatment cell by the number of previous treatment
responses given during the test period. As the plot has no covariate data, we use the first ten
responses for all 2145 clients who submitted at least 10 ratings during the test period. Clients are
not substantially more likely to give more positive ratings on their 10th rating during the test than
they give on their first rating.
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Figure 6: Mean ratings for each treatment cell by the number of previous treatment responses given
during the test period. Error bands are bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals.
A.5 Analysis of cell with randomized order of answer choices
The Average, Randomized contained the same question and answer choices as the Average condition,
but the choices were presented in a random order. If the raters read all the answer choices and pick
the most applicable one, then this condition would have returned a rating distribution identical
to that of the Average condition. However, it does not. Furthermore, the location of the chosen
choice would be distributed uniformly, i.e., the rater should pick the choice presented first as much
as she picks other choices. We find this not to be the case: the first answer choice presented to
the rater is picked 6806/26978 = 25.2% of the time. The second through sixth answer choices are
picked 17.3%, 14.7%, 14.3%, 13.9%, and 14.5% of the time each, respectively.
This phenomenon suggests that (a) a small percentage (up to 10− 13%) of raters do not read
the answer choices at all and simply select the first answer choice, and (b) many raters start
reading from the first presented choice and select the first one that approximately describes their
experience. Our test design cannot disambiguate between these (or other plausible) explanations.
Nevertheless, this effect is second-order relative to the overall finding that more descriptive scales
are substantially more informative than numeric scales, and the Average, Randomized treatment
results are comparable to those of other verbal scales.
A.6 Design approach using labor market data
Table 5 and Figures 7 and 9 contain supplementary information regarding our application of the
design approach to the labor market data, as described in the main text.
Response Score
Condition 0 1 2 3 4 5
Expectations 1.22 1.22 2.28 3.74 4.38 5.00
Adjectives 1.47 1.55 1.63 3.22 4.97 5.00
Average 1.80 1.84 1.88 2.53 3.83 5.00
Average, not affect score 0.89 1.57 1.59 3.32 4.04 5.00
Average, randomized 0.72 2.41 2.63 4.18 4.30 5.00
Numeric 0.50 1.20 1.98 2.88 3.45 5.00
Table 5: Optimal scores φ for each treatment, where the score of the top position is normalized to
5.
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(c) Average, not affect score
0 1 2 3 4 5
Treatment response
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
P
ro
b
ab
ili
ty
at
le
as
t
as
h
ig
h
Low quality
Medium quality
High quality
(d) Average, randomized
Figure 7: Joint distributions of freelancer quality vs. ratings in the other treatment cells. Low,
Medium, and High quality sellers refer to those with other cell average ratings in [0, 2), [2.5, 3.5)
and [4.5, 5], respectively.
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Figure 8: Joint distributions, where Low, Medium, and High quality sellers refer to those with
other cell average ratings in [0, 2), [2, 4) and [4, 5], respectively.
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(a) With optimal φ and probability of exit of 0.01.
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(d) Numeric treatment with different scoring rules
Figure 9: Simulated performance over time with various other configurations. The “Worst” scoring
rule corresponds to the rule φ with the smallest learning rate found for each treatment.
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B Amazon Mechanical Turk synthetic experiment
In this section, we deploy an experiment on Amazon Mechanical Turk (“MTurk”) to repeat and
analyze our design approach, in a synthetic setting where we have expert (external) quality in-
formation on items. We note that this section is not a replication of the behavioral components
of our results, as the MTurk and online labor market settings are too different to meaningfully
compare. Furthermore, one should be aware of limitations of using MTurk convenience samples in
research (Landers and Behrend, 2015); such limitations mean that there will be behavioral biases
that differ from those on other platforms. For these reasons, this section should be seen as a syn-
thetic, example application of our overall comparison and design methodology to other domains,
and in particular will show how our methods are useful not just to counter rating inflation but also
other types of biases.
This appendix section is organized as follows. In B.1 we describe the task, and in B.2 we
repeat our analysis from the main text, including: (B.2.1) showing the resulting marginal and joint
distributions of ratings and quality, and (B.2.2) testing designs on new, unseen data.
B.1 Experiment description
B.1.1 Task Information
We asked subjects to rate the English proficiency of 10 paragraphs which are modified TOEFL
(Test of English as a Foreign Language) essays with known scores as determined by experts and
reported in a TOEFL study guide (Educational Testing Service, 2005); these are our true quality
types for each essay. Expert scores range from 1 through 5, with two paragraphs with each score.
Essays are shortened to a single paragraph of just a few sentences, and the top rated paragraphs
are improved and the worst ones are made worse; this is largely to ensure the quality could be
sufficiently distinguished between paragraphs despite having shortened them. In other words,
for each topic, we improved the language of the best rated paragraph and further degraded the
language of the worst one. In principle, our editing of these paragraphs may remove the validity
of the expert ratings. However, the estimated R(θ, y|Y ) indicates that this does not substantially
occur, suggesting our editing of the paragraphs preserved the quality ordering of the paragraphs
per the expert ratings.
Subjects were given one of five possible verbal scales, where the scales were designed using a list
of adjectives, {Abysmal, Awful, Bad, Poor, Mediocre, Fair, Good, Great, Excellent, Phenomenal},
compiled by Hicks et al. (2000). Each scale had five options. The scales are:
• Every Other: Awful, Poor, Fair, Great, Phenomenal
• Close to Every Other: Abysmal, Poor, Mediocre, Good, Phenomenal
• Extremes: Abysmal, Awful, Bad, Excellent, Phenomenal
• Negative-skewed: Abysmal, Awful, Bad, Poor, Mediocre
• Positive-skewed: Fair, Good, Great, Excellent, Phenomenal
We note that it is not a priori clear which of these scales will perform well in this setting, or
what the optimal scoring mapping should be.
Raters (i.e., mTurk workers) were shown each of the ten paragraphs. The instructions were:
“Please rate on English proficiency (grammar, spelling, sentence structure) and coherence of the
argument, but not on whether you agree with the substance of the text.” The specific question
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(b) Close to Every Other
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(c) Negative-skewed
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(d) Positive-skewed
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(e) Extremes
Figure 10: Joint distributions of rating and expert score on the MTurk training set, by treatment
condition.
then asked was: “How does the following rate on English proficiency and argument coherence?”
One paragraph was shown per page; returning to modify a previous answer was not allowed; and
paragraphs were presented in a random order. Each rater was shown one of the scales picked at
random, and the same scale was used for all paragraphs for that rater. There were approximately
500 raters overall across the 5 treatment cells, with between 97 and 104 raters in each cell. For each
cell, we divide the raters (randomly) into train (75%) and test (25%). We design optimal scoring
rules using the training data, and then test performance on the test data.
B.1.2 Rater logistics
We did not exclude any data, and all raters were paid $1.50. Instructions advised raters to spend
no more than a minute per question, though this was not enforced. The median rater spent 325
seconds, corresponding to a median wage of $16.61/hr. About 80% of raters spent 8 minutes or
less.
B.2 Results
We now repeat the design and test procedure from the main text, for this setting. All plots, figures,
and scoring rules are generated exactly as in the main text, with the following exceptions: (1) we
have true expert scores for the paragraph qualities and so do not use the procedure where we
estimate such qualities from the other treatment cells, and (2) we split the rater responses into test
and training sets. We show the joint distributions R(·|Y ) and optimal scores calculated from the
training set, and then we evaluate performance on simulations using the test set.
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Learning rates
Condition Equally spaced φ Optimal φ
Every Other 0.058 0.069
Extremes 0.077 0.079
Negative-skewed 0.051 0.059
Positive-skewed 0.034 0.043
Close to Every Other 0.043 0.044
Table 6: Large deviation learning rates for each treatment in the Mturk experiment, calculated using
Equation (4) and the joint distributions generated using the training data plotted in Figure 10.
Optimal for each treatment corresponds to the highest learning rate among many random score
functions tested.
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Figure 11: Simulated performance of each rating scale with Equally Spaced scores.
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B.2.1 Rating distributions and learning rates
Figure 10 shows the joint distributions of rating and expert score on the MTurk training set,
for each treatment condition. Note that each of the treatment conditions produce different joint
distributions, even the two conditions with similar verbal scales, Every Other and Close to Every
Other. Furthermore, note that even with these joint distributions, it is not immediately obvious
which one(s) will induce the best learning rates.
Next, we calculate optimal score functions for each treatment using the training joint distribu-
tions. Table 6 shows the training set learning rates for each treatment using equally spaced scores,
as well as the best performing scores, respectively. The various designs have dramatically different
rates, even when the rating scales use similar phrases.
B.2.2 Simulations of accuracy over time
Finally, we simulate the performance of the designs (generated using the training data), following
the same simulation technique as outlined in the main text. We also evaluate performance on
the test data, in order to demonstrate how a platform would use our design approach. Figure 11
shows the resulting errors over time with Equally Spaced scores. Errors with optimal scores are
qualitatively similar.
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C Proofs
Lemma 1.
lim
k→∞
−1
k
log [µ((xk(θ1)− xk(θ2)) ≤ 0|θ1, θ2)] = inf
a∈R
{g(θ1)I(a|θ1) + g(θ2)I(a|θ2)}
where I(a|`) = supz{za−Λ(z|θ)}, Λ(z|θ) is the log moment generating function of a single sample
from x(θ1), and g(θ) is the sampling rate.
Proof. limk→∞− 1k log [µ((xk(θ1)− xk(θ2)) ≤ 0|θ1, θ2)]
= lim
k→∞
−1
k
log
[∫
a∈R
µ((xk(θ1) = a|θ1)µ(xk(θ2) ≥ a|θ2)da
]
(5)
= lim
k→∞
−1
k
log
[∫
a∈R
e−kg(θ1)I(a|θ1)e−kg(θ2)I(a|θ2)da
]
(6)
= inf
a∈R
{g(θ1)I(a|θ1) + g(θ2)I(a|θ2)} Laplace principle (7)
Where (6) is a basic result from large deviations, and kg(θi) is the number of samples item of
quality θi has received. 
This lemma also appears in Glynn and Juneja (2004), which uses the Gartner-Ellis Theorem in
the proof. Our proof is conceptually similar but instead uses Laplace’s principle.
We can now establish the rate function for Pk(θ1, θ2).
Recall Pk(θ1, θ2) = µk(xk(θ1) > xk(θ2)|θ1, θ2)− µk(xk(θ1) < xk(θ2)|θ1, θ2). Then, we have
Lemma 2. Given θ1, θ2, let P k(θ1, θ2) = 1− Pk(θ1, θ2). Then:
− lim
k→∞
1
k
logP k(θ1, θ2) = inf
a∈R
{g(θ1)I(a|θ1) + g(θ2)I(a|θ2)} , (8)
where I(a|θ) = supz{za − Λ(z|θ)}, and Λ(z|θ) is the log moment generating function of a single
rating given to seller of type θ:
Λ(z|θ) = log
∑
y∈Y
ρ(θ, y|Y ) exp(zφ(y)).
Proof. Follows directly from Lemma 1.
− lim
k→∞
1
k
logP k(θ1, θ2|β)
= lim
k→∞
−1
k
log [1 + µk(xk(θ1)− xk(θ2) < 0|θ1, θ2)− µk(xk(θ1)− xk(θ2) > 0|θ1, θ2)]
= lim
k→∞
−1
k
log [2µk(xk(θ1)− xk(θ2) < 0|θ1, θ2) + µk(xk(θ1)− xk(θ2) = 0|θ1, θ2)]
= inf
a∈R
{g(θ1)I(a|θ1) + g(θ2)I(a|θ2)} Lemma 1

Now we show that this rate function transfers to a rate function for Wk.
Proof of Theorem 1
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r , − lim
k→∞
1
k
log(1−Wk) = min
0≤i<M
inf
a∈R
{g(θi+1)I(a|θi+1) + g(θi)I(a|θi)} (9)
where I(a|θ) = supz{za − Λ(z|θ)}, and Λ(z|θ) = log
∑
y∈Y ρ(θ, y|Y ) exp(zφ(y)) is the log moment
generating function of a single rating given to seller of type θ.
Proof.
− lim
k→∞
1
k
log(1−Wk) = − lim
k→∞
1
k
log
1− 2
M(M − 1)
∑
θ1>θ2∈Θ
Pk(θ1, θ2)
 (10)
= − lim
k→∞
1
k
log
2
M(M − 1)
∑
0≤i<j≤M
P k(θj , θi) (11)
= − max
0≤i<j≤M
(
lim
k→∞
1
k
log
(
P k(θj , θi)
))
= min
0≤i<j≤M
(
− lim
k→∞
1
k
[
log
(
P k(θj , θi)
)])
(12)
= min
0≤i<j≤M
inf
a∈R
{g(θj)I(a|θj) + g(θi)I(a|θi)} (13)
= min
0≤i<M
inf
a∈R
{g(θi+1)I(a|θi+1) + g(θi)I(a|θi)} (14)
Where the last line follows from adjacent θi, θi+1 dominating the rate due to properties of R.
Line (12) follows from: ∀ai ≥ 0, lim sup→0
[
 log
(∑N
i a

i
)]
= maxNi lim sup→0 log(a

i). See, e.g.,
Lemma 1.2.15 in Dembo and Zeitouni (2010) for a proof of this property.

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